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PROBLEMS WITH WIREDU’S EMPIRICALISM
Martin Odei Ajei1 
Abstract
In his “Empiricalism: The Empirical Character of an African Philosophy”, 
Kwasi Wiredu sets out to reject some logical and epistemological categorial 
distinctions that can be deployed as instruments for misunderstanding and 
denigrating African modes of thought. Towards this end, he enunciates 
a doctrine he calls ‘empiricalism’, which he considers is conclusively 
characteristic of Akan philosophy. In doing so, Wiredu ascribes some 
ideas to Akan metaphysics that I consider disputable. This paper aims at 
contesting those ascriptions. I begin with Wiredu’s thesis and arguments 
in favour of empiricalism, and proceed to formulate and discuss what 
I perceive to be the major problems with the doctrine.  The paper ends 
by offering suggestions on how the problems engendered by Wiredu’s 
empiricalism may be resolved, and by surveying the prospects of the 
doctrine for African philosophy. 
1. Introduction:
In his “Empiricalism: The Empirical Character of an African Philosophyi”, 
Kwasi Wiredu sets out to reject some logical and epistemological categorial 
distinctions that can be deployed as instruments for misunderstanding and 
denigrating African modes of thought. Prominent among these are the 
analytic versus synthetic and the a priori versus a posteriori distinctions. 
Two other dichotomies that he refutes are those between empirically and 
metaphysically oriented modes of thinking and between concrete and 
abstract modes of thinking.
  1Martin Odei Ajei is a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana.   
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In rejecting these dichotomies, Wiredu enunciates a doctrine he calls 
‘empiricalism’, which he considers inspired by both Akan thought 
regarding the character of human knowledge, and some tenets of 
empiricism (Wiredu 2011: 33). In his insistence that empiricalism 
conclusively characterizes Akan philosophy, Wiredu ascribes some 
ideas to Akan metaphysics that I consider disputable. This paper aims at 
disputing those ascriptions. I begin with Wiredu’s thesis and arguments 
in favour of empiricalism. I will then formulate what I perceive to be 
the major problems with the doctrine and offer systematic accounts of 
concepts in  Akan metaphysics and epistemology which refute Wiredu’s 
views on them.  I hope by this effort to show that Wiredu’s invocation of 
Akan thought as the foundation of his doctrine is less justified than he 
admits.  The paper ends by surveying the prospects of empiricalism for 
African philosophy.  
2. Empiricalism and Empirical Metaphysics
Wiredu proclaims empiricalism as characterizing a system of thought 
that is essentially empiricalii  in its conceptual constitution. As such, 
its cognitive imperative is “do not admit any existents or categories of 
existents unless they are supportable by empirical evidence or empirically 
based conceptual reflection (Wiredu 2011: 31). Empiricalism embraces 
some of the imperatives of empiricism and rejects its excessive reliance on 
sensation as the basis of knowledge: it shares with empiricism the belief 
that all our knowledge of the external world as well as our concepts are 
derived from experience, but rejects empiricism’s construal of experience 
as a process in which objects of the mind are ideas or impressions, where 
an idea or an impression is a sensation (Wiredu, 2011: 31-33). 
The claim that empiricalism is empirical in its conceptual constitution 
means that it is secured by an empirical metaphysical system. Such a 
system is one in which all propositions are ultimately “constructed out of 
empirical raw materials” (Wiredu 2011: 23). What this means is that the 
system may contain propositions which are non-empirical with respect 
to their truth-value, but all its constituent propositions will be empirical 
with respect to their conceptual constitution (Wiredu 2011: 22). To say 
that concepts are empirically constituted conceptually is to say that they 
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are either derivable from experience or refer to an aspect or mode of 
experience. Accordingly, such concepts can refer only to realms of reality 
within the reach of actual or possible experience, and have as conditions 
of their intelligibility actual or possible experience (Wiredu 2011: 23).
Wiredu substantiates his denial of the stated polarities by showing, among 
others, that an empirical metaphysical system contains both empirical 
and metaphysical propositions as well as propositions of different logical 
(analytic and synthetic) and epistemological (a priori and a posteriori) 
types. He does this by inviting us to consider the proposition: “all 
brothers are male”, and demonstrating the  analyticity and a priority of 
the proposition by pointing out that its truth value can be determined 
simply by analyzing the relationship among its constitutive concepts. The 
concepts ‘brother’ and ‘male’ are empirical in the sense that they can only 
be formed through experience. Even the quantificational concepts “all” 
and “are” are likewise derived from experience, as “they refer to modes 
of experiencing and to modes of reflecting upon our experiences and their 
objects” (ibid.). Hence, on his terms, they are empirical.   
Central to Wiredu’s arguments is his insistence that an empirical 
metaphysic characterizes Akan thought. This would mean Akan thought 
considers experience - both actual and possible - as the only condition of 
intelligibility of its postulates. For this reason, Wiredu denies to Akan 
metaphysics the intelligibility of transcendental concepts, which he 
defines as “concepts referring to entities, beings, processes, relations that 
are, in principle, not conceivable through possible experience” (Wiredu 
2011: 27). On this view, concepts such as God, Time and  Space can be 
intelligible in Akan metaphysics only if they are irreducibly empirical. 
I think that such a view implies that the only admissible doctrine that 
Akan metaphysics espouses is a thoroughgoing physicalism that conceives 
of everything in existence as ultimately physical. Wiredu seems to base 
his empiricalism on such a totalistic metaphysical doctrine. Empiricalism, 
then, is a version of materialism. However, I argue from Sections four 
to six that both philosophical and linguistic considerations in Akan 
render such a position quite mistaken.  Before then, let us consider some 
conceptual challenges to Wiredu’s empirical notions of space and time.
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3. Empirical Notions of Space and Time
According to Wiredu the only way to conceive of space “is through the 
notions of location or place and of infinite extendibility, both of which 
are empirical” (Wiredu 2011: 28). He asserts that such a conception is 
influenced by Akan thought (ibid.). In my opinion the contents of an 
empirical metaphysical system must ultimately constitute objects of 
possible empirical experience. If so, then it is doubtful if Wiredu’s 
understanding of the notions of space and time can cohere well with other 
concepts in an empirical metaphysical system which, as indicated, must 
refer only to existents within the reach of actual or possible experience. 
As such, empirical concepts can only be understood by generalization 
or extension from particular instances. Given this, it is doubtful whether 
Wiredu’s notion of “infinite extendibility” can stand without amendment 
in an empirical metaphysical system.  
Furthermore, I agree with Wiredu that the terms ‘location’ and place’ in 
the Akan language signify ‘space’. However, it is doubtful whether the 
notion of infinite extension can be easily attributable to Akan thought. 
Such an idea will be rendered in the language as “bεεbi a enni εwieε”, 
i.e; “a place/location that has no bounds” or “an endless place/location”. 
It is doubtful whether such a concept will be admitted as intelligible in 
the language. Even if it is, it is doubtful whether such a concept would 
be admitted by the users of the language as empirical in its conceptual 
constitution in the sense that it is derivable from experience or refers 
to an aspect or mode of experience. These doubts arise from the sort of 
association that Wiredu makes between the concepts of ‘infinity’ and 
‘empirical’. It seems to me that these two notions are antithetical in such 
a manner as to  make them cohere only in constant tension with each 
other. My reasons for saying this are that the conceptual idea of space as 
extendible location is irreducibly locative. As such, it can only yield the 
idea of space as a series of places. If so, then two problems arise. First, it 
is difficult to conceive an infinity of it; and second, even if we succeed in 
doing so, it becomes difficult to understand how we can experience such 
an infinity. The question then becomes: what will the actual or potential 
experience of such an infinitely extendible location be like? 
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In my view, if we can only experience space as a place of limited 
instances, then we cannot experience it as infinitely extendible series of 
locations. Such an idea of space cannot be accessible to experience. It 
will appear that Wiredu has associated the two notions in such a way 
as to suppose a transition from the finite to the infinite, the concrete to 
the immeasurable, without outlining the mechanism of their association. 
The idea of “unboundedly extendible location” is even more accessible 
empirically than the idea of “infinitely extendible location”. This is 
because the notion of ‘unbounded’ is more amenable to experience than 
that of ‘infinity’. “Unbounded’ also suggests a more stringent commitment 
to an empiricist metaphysic than the notion of infinity does.  However, 
the idea of ‘unboundedly extendible location’ translates into the patently 
absurd idea of ‘an unbounded series of bounded locations’.  Yet, in my 
view, it is conceptually less problematic than the idea of infinitely bound 
space.  These considerations lead to two suggestions. The first is that by 
employing infinity to define space in the manner he does, Wiredu may 
have subscribed to a metaphysical commitment usually identified with 
transcendental conceptsiii, which he claims are not intelligible in Akan 
thought. However, Wiredu cannot subscribe to a transcendental concept 
without violating the structure of his empiricalism. The secondly is that it 
is doubtful whether his empiricalism  can be  attributed to Akan thought, 
because the Akan conceptual scheme contains transcendental concepts 
that are definitely intelligible in that scheme.  These objections to  Wiredu’s 
definition of space  apply likewise and in exact measure to his proposed 
definition of time as a series of events “inevitably or immediately to occur 
and those of the infinite future of whatever metaphysical status” (Wiredu 
2011: 30).   
4. Quasi-materiality and the Empirical Concept of God 
It would be difficult to maintain a reasoned belief in a transcendental concept 
of God in Akan thought on Wiredu’s definition of transcendentalism and 
his empirical metaphysics.  Besides his pronouncements in his essay that 
have formed the basis of the discussion so far,  this conclusion lies well-
argued on the surface of his ontology of God in his Cultural Universals 
and Particulars. In this book, he confirms the view widely held by 
Akan philosophersiv that Akan ontology espouses a hierarchy of beings 
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at the apex of which is the Supreme Being (God). He then asserts that 
“everything that exists in [the ontology] exists in exactly the same sense 
as everything else. And this sense is empirical” (Wiredu 1996: 49). This 
is another utterance of empirical metaphysics, asserted in the context of 
the thoroughgoing physicalism that I alluded to in Section One. For this 
reason, I consider Cultural Universals and Particulars and “Empiricalism: 
The Empirical Character of an African Philosophy” organically linked, 
and will therefore draw on Wiredu’s views in the former to illustrate my 
objections to his views in the latter.
Existence, in this metaphysics, belongs only to fully material and quasi-
material beings; and a quasi-material being is “any being or entity 
conceived as spatial but lacking some of the properties of material objects” 
(Wiredu 1996: 53). All existing entities cannot sustain their existence in 
some realm other than that governed by the laws of physics (Wiredu 1996: 
50). Therefore, the existence of a transcendent Godv is not only  false 
but also incomprehensible in Akan thought (Wiredu 1996: 40-50). The 
same conclusion applies to notions like “spiritual” and “supernatural” if 
these refer to entities that sustain their existence in some realm other than 
that governed by the laws of physics. As we have seen, the ontological 
status of Wiredu’s quasi-material beings is central to the structure of his 
empirical metaphysical system. It will therefore not be amiss to consider 
this category of being in some detail in a bid to illuminate my point that 
quasi-physicalism ultimately reduces to physicalism. 
Besides Wiredu, Safro Kwame is the only philosopher I know who 
explicitly affirms the plausibility of this category of being. Since he 
identifies his version of the category with Wiredu’s, it will be meaningful 
to bring his views into this discussion. In Safro Kwame’s view, quasi-
physicalism is “a limited version of physicalism” (Safro-Kwame 2004: 
346) characterized by three mutually reinforcing attributes. Firstly, it 
admits the possibility of the existence of objects belonging to a category 
between those that obey the known laws of physics and those that do not. 
Secondly, it rejects any claims of the existence of spiritual or immaterial 
objects on the grounds that such claims are conceptually confused, 
unclear and in breach of Ockam’s razor. And, thirdly, it “stretches the 
limits of matter or materialism as far as is compatible with what we know 
or do not know, without embracing dualism” (ibid.).
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Kwame denies that adhering to quasi-physicalism implies acceptance of 
physicalismvi.  His foremost reason for this denial is that in the philosophy 
of mind, physicalism necessarily reduces to the mind-brain identity 
thesisvii. Yet it provides insufficient evidence in support of this reduction 
as there exists compelling conclusions on the limitations of science to 
justify the reduction of all mental events to physiological states (Safro 
Kwame: 344-345). Therefore, even though he assumes as obvious the 
existence of physical objects, he finds no compelling reason for endorsing 
physicalism rather than quasi-physicalism.
However, this ostensible distinction between the quasi-physical and 
the physical, attributed to epistemic modesty, dissolves into full-blown 
materialism on closer inspection. The mechanism of this dissolution 
is the allure of scientific knowledge and evidence. Thus, according to 
Safro Kwame, the progress of scientific knowledge is likely to render the 
“the quasi-physicalism of today” as “the materialism or physicalism of 
tomorrow” (Safro Kwame: 1996: 346). On this view, all current quasi-
physical beings are but, in fact, physical-to-be beings. It is for this reason 
that I think the distinction between the quasi-physical and physical is 
vacuousviii.  
Other indications of Safro Kwame’s full-blown physicalism disguised as 
quasi-physicalism reveal themselves in the normative judgment implied 
in his dismissal of claims of the existence of non-material entities as 
conceptually unclear. It is easily inferred from the tenor of his arguments 
that conceptual clarity is best established by the conceptual tools employed 
in scientific investigation of entities comprising “atoms, fields, energies, 
sets, and numbers” (ibid). From this, the conclusion that a non-materialist 
concept of God in Akan thought is conceptually unclear can be drawn 
without difficulty. Gyekye has criticized Wiredu’s  category of the quasi-
physical in the context of their debate on the metaphysical constituents 
of a person in Akan thought.  He objects to the idea of quasi-physical 
entitiesix on the grounds that it is obscure, and mistaken when applied to the 
Akan concept of okra (Gyekye 1987: 86)x.  As seen, Wiredu’s physicalist 
metaphysics, which admits only of material and quasi-material beings, 
yields the same conclusion on the nature of God as the conclusion we 
drew in the previous paragraph from Safro Kwame’s work.   Gyekye’s 
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objections gain more credence in the discussion of the nature and attributes 
of God because if the quasi-physical entities of Wiredu’s  metaphysics are 
granted, then God and all other beings postulated in Akan ontology will 
fully assume the attributes of material objects. However, it is doubtful that 
such characterization of the nature of the Akan God would be correct.
It is important to reiterate at this juncture in our deliberations that 
counter-examples to a physicalist/materialist and non-transcendentalist 
conception of God abound in the Akan language and philosophical 
thinking.  If we admit the idea of infinity as a transcendental concept, 
then a long tradition in Akan philosophy suggests, along with J. B. 
Danquah, that we cannot insist that the only intelligible concept of God 
in Akan thought is  a non-transcendental one. Among the names and 
appellations that Danquah assigns to the Supreme Being in Akan Doctrine 
of God is Odomankoma. According to him, “Odomankoma corresponds 
to a conception of the Godhead as the Interminable or Infinite Being” 
(Danquah 1944: 30). Further to this, the term also yields the meaning of 
an “eternal, inexhaustible, undimensional” being (Danquah 1944: ibid.). 
It is worth observing how Danquah makes a special effort to specify his 
meaning of Odomankoma. According to him, the various meanings of 
the word “are not to be understood in simple plurarity or severalty senses. 
There are several words available in the language to express those ideas, 
such as bebree (many); pii (plentiful); peewa (copious), etc., and when 
Odomankoma is used in the sense of manifold it must be understood in the 
deeper sense of infinitely manifolding” (Danquah 1944: 59). The concepts 
that Danquah contrasts with the “infinitely manifolding” are empirical 
ones. This compels the conclusion that he distinguishes his meaning of 
Odomankoma from any empirically derived ones. Accordingly, Danquah 
admits a transcendental concept of God. 
Gyekye accepts Danquah’s insights on the subject, and adds to them 
with the claim that “Onyamexi is the Absolute Reality, the origin of all 
things……..Absolute Reality is beyond and independent of the categories 
of time, space, and cause” (Gyekye 1987: 70). We can gather from these 
views that credible conceptions of infinite space and time, and of a 
transcendental God can be made in Akan philosophy which definitely 
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admits the reality of a realm beyond experience. Hence Wiredu cannot 
claim that his empirical metaphysic represents, without qualification, 
Akan philosophical thinking. 
5. A Nuanced Ontology
An argument may be advanced in favour of the empirical concept of God 
in Wiredu’s empirical metaphysics. The attributes of such a God will 
not merely be theoretic or nominally empirical, as belief in Him can be 
considered to imply and generate a causal effect on the behavior of the 
believer. And if one does x because one believes God wills one to do x, 
then since the behavioural manifestation of such belief is experiential, 
the source of the belief may arguably be considered to be involved in the 
empiricalxii. Attractive as this argument is, it is doubtful whether it can be 
deployed in favour of Wiredu. At least three reasons will count against 
such support. 
Firstly, it is not at all certain that empirical behavior should manifest a 
belief. Even if it does, it is not clear why the fact that it does means that 
the object of the belief is part-empirical. Secondly, it has been argued 
that Akans hold a transcendental concept of God. As seen in Section 
One, Wiredu defines transcendental concepts as referring to entities etc. 
that cannot be conceived, even in principle, through actual or possible 
experience. This is inconsistent with the hypothetical argument above. 
Thirdly,  the conclusion of the said argument is severely undermined 
by Wiredu’s assertion that “the belief in Nyame has no essential role in 
the conduct of Akan life” (Wiredu 1996: 57), in that if this belief were 
absent from Akan consciousness, absolutely nothing would be lost “in 
terms of sustenance of any institutions or procedures of practical life” 
(Wiredu 1996: ibid.). These claims vitiate the strength of any appeal to an 
empirical concept of God. Besides this, they are as mistaken as the idea 
of attributing an ontologically homogeneous materiality to Akan thought. 
Besides Danquah’s philosophy of God and Gyekye’s patent agreement 
with the idea of a transcendent God, numerous examples can be found to 
show that Nyame plays as essential role in the conduct of life in Akanland 
in the sustenance of institutional processes and thereby refute the two 
quotations above. 
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In the first place, even though the source and justification of Akan morality 
is not divine (Wiredu 1992: 194; Gyekye 1987: 146; Asamoah 2000: 23), 
the Akan language and the attitudes of many Akans assign a significant 
role to God in moral deliberations. For instance, when a person (x) suffers 
an injury at the hands of another (y), and where x sees no practical resort 
to reparation for the injury suffered, and yet considers reparation as 
necessary or deserving, but does not consider retribution as an option, 
x would resort to the intervention of God for remedy by saying “Nyame 
betua wo ka!”, meaning “ God will pay you back”. Similarly, when many 
Akans consider that they have avoided some calamity without any rational 
or empirical cause of that avoidance, they may say: “anka nyame ampata 
a………”, which means, “had God not intervened………”. What these 
statements show is that the belief in God by some Akans affects their 
conduct. Now, if God can also be conceived of as a transcendental being, 
as argued in Section 4.0, then these two examples have two implications 
for our discussion. They show, first of all, that the belief in Nyame has a role 
to play in Akan life because it affects the conduct of some Akan people, 
and secondly that there is obvious tension between Wiredu’s statement of 
an empirical metaphysic which does not allow for a transcendental God, 
and these statements which allow for a transcendental God that influences 
the world empirically. 
Why could Wiredu not reply that the makers of these statements that 
exemplify the ordinary usage of the Akan language are conceptually 
confused, and therefore misuse Akan concepts? This appeal to conceptual 
confusion will fail, and the reason becomes clear when we consider 
Wiredu’s claim that God plays no role in sustaining Akan institutions. 
In response to this claim, I wish to point out that virtually every formal 
ceremony in both the public and private spheres of Akan life, regardless 
of its importance, begins with the pouring of libation, and every Akan 
libation begins by summoning Nyame. What this suggests is that the 
attributes of a transcendentally conceived God do not necessarily have 
to be exclusively theoretic and non-empirical either. Assigning some 
empirical attributes to God is quite compatible with the idea of Him as a 
being that transcends the empirical world. 
195        AjeiVolume 23 (2012)
We cannot escape the fact that the Akan doctrine of God, as well as its 
ontology of non-material existence, is very nuanced. As Wiredu himself 
admits, spatial imagery and symbolization are employed very often in 
talking about “extra-human beings and powers, even including God” 
(Wiredu 1996: 52) in Akan discourses. He confirms this while refuting 
the strict polarity of theoretical and practical modes of thought by stating 
that “frequently, a theoretical reflection would be couched in a practical 
phraseology…. Generally, the ascent from practical vocabulary to 
theoretical thought will be via metaphor” (Wiredu 2011: 19). In fact, the 
dexterous employment and interpretation of metaphors have resonance 
and are very revered in Akan discourse. For this reason, we can accept 
the soundness of representing attributes of God in physical imagery as 
metaphorical reflections of the ontological nuances that do not preclude 
his conception as a being that essentially transcends the space-time 
scheme. Thus the appeal to conceptual confusion fails.
6. God the Invisible and invincible Father
These nuances are well captured in discussions on Akan thought 
regarding the relationship of God to the universe of being. Wiredu has 
distinguished the notion of ‘the world’ from ‘the universe’, and asserted 
that as creator of ‘the world’, God cannot be part of it. However, “we might 
then reserve the word “universe” for the totality of absolutely all existents. 
In this sense, God would be part of the universe” (Wiredu 1996: 50). He 
translates ‘the world’ in Akan as ‘abodeε’, but provides no translation for 
‘the universe’. I disagree with his translation of abodeε as ‘the world’, as 
I do his claim that God must be part of the universe, if this implies his 
non-transcendence of it.
In my view, the concept “abodeε”, which literally translates into English 
as “created thing(s)”, is the widest of God’s creations, and constitutes 
‘nature’ at largexiii. As such, it includes the idea of “the universe” in English, 
which I understand as the totality of everything that exists in space-time, 
including all physical space, time, matter and energy, the planets, stars, 
galaxies, and the contents of intergalactic space” (Wikipedia.org).  Then 
there is “ewiase”, which is a narrower concept, and whose etymology 
provides a good guide to its understanding. It is a contraction of two 
196 Legon Journal of the HUMANITIES Volume 23 (2012)
words: “ewi” and “ase”.  “Ewi” connotes the English expressions “the 
skies above”, “the heavens”. It can therefore be understood to refer to 
everything that lies some distance above the surface of Earth, including 
the atmosphere and the rest of outer space. Thus interpreted, “ewi” would 
seem to refer to all celestial bodies and the void that exists between them. 
However, this would hardly be distinguishable from “abodeε”. If we 
grant that such ambiguity would hardly be intended, then “ewi” is better 
interpreted to refer strictly to the sun together with its planetary system. 
One reason why this intepretation is plausible is that the Akan word for 
the “sun” is “εwia”, which is clearly derived from the root “wi”. This is 
given credence by the fact that the Akan expression “ewi mu adjo” means, 
“the sun has gone down”. 
The term “ase”, on the other hand means “under” or below”. Accordingly, 
“ewiase” can be held to refer to the atmosphere in the solar system. 
According to my interpretation, then, “abode” is a wider concept than 
“ewiase” in the sense that it alludes to the existence of other planetary 
systems and can include existing things of which we may have no 
knowledge. If my distinction between ewiase and abodeε is correct, 
then Wiredu’s claim that Onyame is part of the universe (“abode”) can 
hardly be sustained in Akan ontology, a basic postulate of which is that 
God exists, as do all other entities which He has created, on a continuum 
of existence. I subscribe to the view that this continuum of existence 
comprises visible and invisible, as well as immanent and transcendental 
realms which multiple categories of existents inhabit and conduct their 
being in accordance with the potency of the sunsum encoded in them 
(Gyekye 1987: 73; Minkus 1977: 114). All existents share in sunsum, a 
non-material power that links them and distinguishes their place on the 
continuum. In a nutshell, the level of the sunsum of a being determines 
its place on the hierarchy of existence, and place on the hierarchy 
differentiates different kinds of beings. 
Therefore, the continuum does not have to be conceived as entirely 
susceptible to space-time coordinates. It does not have to represent an 
ontologically homogeneous materiality. There is thus no strict and 
diametrically opposed distinction between the two realms of existence, 
so the various categories in them can freely relate to, and influence 
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each other. Thus Wiredu is right in insisting (Wiredu 1996: 55) that 
the Cartesian notion of ‘spiritual’ as ‘fully immaterial’ is not rightfully 
attributed to Akan philosophy as Gyekye does (Gyekye 1987: 87). But this 
rejection of Cartesian dualism should not imply an exclusive endorsement 
of full-blown material monism. In my view, Akan thought allows  for 
freely asserting the reality of spirits and immaterial beings in the 
universe without insisting that these kinds of beings are fundamentally 
quasi-physical, a term which,  as we have argued, reduces to “ultimately 
physical”. 
7. Logic is not a Gift from Heaven
Regarding the metaphysics of the person Engmann observes, correctly, 
I think, that the differences between Gyekye and Wiredu reduce to one 
question, i.e, “What is the nature of that being which, when it is physically 
observed, is sunsum, and when it is not observed, is sunsum?  Are we 
to say that it is physical or non-physical?” (Engmann 1992: 171). When 
applied to our discussion about God, this question can be reframed thus: 
“what is the nature of that being which, when empirically felt, is God, 
and when not empirically felt, is God?” Are we to say that it is spiritual/
immaterial or not spiritual/immaterial?
However, we must note that bifurcated as it is, Engmann’s question is 
not well framed. What is indeed one question becomes two, with two 
distinct objectives.  The first question interrogates the nature of God, and 
the second prescribes two possible answers to the first.  But taking into 
consideration the context in which the question arises, I think the only 
legitimate question is the first one.  It is the one with enough vigour and 
direction to challenge us toward a useful answer. The second question 
erodes the interrogative force of the first question by reducing the range 
of possible answers to it to only two.  Consequently, this second question 
suggests that there are only two possible and opposite answers to the first 
question, and pretends that the solution to this problem lies necessarily 
in the laws of traditional logic, as if we have on our hands a riddle whose 
resolution must be “either/or”.
Such a resolution may have sufficed had the reality of God or sunsum 
198 Legon Journal of the HUMANITIES Volume 23 (2012)
been experienced by Akans as inextricably locked under the key of logical 
rules. But it cannot be decided beforehand that logic and its fundamental 
rules provide the best standard for resolving the question about the nature 
of being as such.  In connection with this insight, it may be useful to 
ponder Heidegger’s pronouncement on the role that logic has played in 
generating  and sustaining a crisis of ontology in Western philosophy: 
“perhaps the whole body of logic as it is known to us, perhaps all the logic 
that we treat as a gift from heaven, is grounded in a very definite answer 
to the question about the essent; perhaps in consequence all thinking 
which solely follows the laws of thought prescribed by traditional logic 
is incapable from the very start of even understanding the question about 
the essent by its own resources; let alone actually unfolding the question 
and guiding it towards an answer” (Heidegger 1987: 25).
Let us note that the ‘definite answer’ that Heidegger alludes to in the 
passage is the essent’s assumed definition and full absorption by the 
Law of Identityxiv, which predominates over the law of the excluded 
middlexv. In consonance with this definition, I believe that a metaphysical 
conception of a Supreme Being as a spirit that both transcends and 
influences events in the empirical world is both intelligible and well 
founded within philosophical framework that is not exclusively regulated 
by these laws. The Akan conceptual scheme may be one such idea. The 
rigorous distinctions between matter/spirit, transcendence/immanence, 
metaphysical/empirical would then be subject to nullification in some 
aspects of Akan philosophical thinking. That this may be the case is 
exemplified by  the range of attributes some Akan philosophers, like 
Danquah, ascribe to God. This range of attributes suggests that one can 
reserve the right to preclude the law of excluded middle in determining 
the validity of the claim that God  concurrently transcends and is the 
subject of experience in the physical world. And this position conforms 
fully to modern systems of logic which reject the Law of Identity and its 
cognatesxvi. 
The annulment of the laws of formal logic in thinking about the nature 
and attributes of God can be justified, among others means, by appealing 
to a mode of reasoning that conceives categories polarized by formal 
logical rules as mutually inclusive classes of entities that are capable of 
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fusing in a way that sustains their original features. By admitting a God 
that is inherently both transcendent and immanent, Danquah’s philosophy 
of God seems to appeal to this kind of reasoning.
 Perhaps this interpretation I am giving to Danquah’s concept of God and 
to Akan ontology in general can derive some support from Nkrumah’s 
‘categorial conversion’, which espouses a  synthesis of the metaphysical 
concepts of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ in a way that de-emphasizes the Law of 
Identity.  The conversion is enabled by Nkrumah’s materialist perspective 
which proceeds from the metaphysical assumption that matter is the 
primary but not the sole reality of the universe, and constitutes “a plenum 
of forces which are in antithesis with each other” (Nkrumah 1970: 79). 
These material forces are “perpetually active” (Nkrumah 1970: 20), and 
thus “endowed with powers of self-motion” (Nkrumah 1970: 79). 
However, consciousnessxvii is also part of the furniture of the universe of 
Nkrumah’s materialism, as is energy and matter.  To resolve the logical 
problem of the interaction of consciousness and matter without incurring 
the categorical absurdity inherent in the mind-body problem, Nkrumah 
proposes categorial conversion as the process that enables “the emergence 
of self-consciousness from that which is not self-conscious; such a 
thing as the emergence of mind from matter, of quality from quantity” 
(Nkrumah 1970: 20).  In Nkrumah’s system, the independence of mind 
and matter is axiomatic (Nkrumah 1970: 19). Yet, in his view, “both in 
metaphysics and in theory of knowledge, [the difference] does not become 
fundamental and irreducible”  (Nkrumah 1970: 23). As suggested earlier, 
Akan ontology proscribes such a reduction by insisting that the categories 
can interact without annexing the other. It does so by positing two distinct 
but mutually inclusive and dependent categories. Likewise, Nkrumah 
resolves the problem by positing matter as a fundamental principle with 
a permanent potential and capability to transform itself into mind and 
consciousness.  
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8. Conclusions
According to Wiredu, an empirical metaphysics, which rejects 
transcendental realities, characterizes Akan metaphysics and sustains 
empiricalism. I have tried to argue that the plausibility of such a 
metaphysical system characterizing the Akan conceptual scheme is 
vitiated by the views of other philosophers and other Akans of conceptual 
facility. Therefore the weak foundation upon which empiricalism rests 
in Akan thought cannot suffice to justify the denial of the rationality 
and coherence of transcendental concepts in Akan philosophy. I have 
suggested that Wiredu’s definition of such metaphysical concepts as 
space, time and God must be broadened to include the viability of their 
non-empirical ascriptions if he wishes to identify his definitions with 
Akan philosophical thinking. Without such inclusion, the admissibility 
of those definitions will remain in doubt from the point of view of Akan 
philosophy and many African indigenous knowledge systems. 
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Notes
i  In Lauer, H., et al (eds.), 2011,  Identity Meets Nationality: Voices from the 
Humanities, Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, pp. 18 – 34
ii  An empirical proposition is given its usual meaning as one whose truth or 
falsity can be known only through experience, by Wiredu.
 iii I am indebted to Dr. Carlton Simpson of the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Ghana, for his role in clarifying some of these ideas during 
my presentation of a version of this paper at a seminar in the Department 
in May 2011.  
iv  Wiredu, K., 1996, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African 
Perspective, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 46
v  On Wiredu’s terms, this means a God that is in fact and in principle not 
subject to experience.
vi  Defined as the thesis that only physical objects exist, or that if anything 
exists then that thing can be accounted for by the language and laws of 
physics.   
vii  The thesis that if mental states and events exist apart from brain states, then 
they can be described in solely physical terms.
viii  This prediction about the future of science, which projects a reduction of 
all the sciences to physics, represents what is usually called  “the thesis of 
the unity of science”. The thesis is precisely as Safro Kwame states it: that 
with sufficient knowledge about the nature of the human psyche, it will 
be evident that the human psychological system can be fully described 
and explained with the theoretical tools of physics. For a fuller discussion 
of this “thesis”, see Rosenthal, D. M., 2000, “Introduction”, in (ed), 
Rosenthat, D. M, Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Hackett Publishing, pp. 5-6 
ix  And by implication the agency of any such entity
x   Here, Gyekye specifies that the okra is devoid of any physical attributes. It 
is a speck of the nature of the Supreme Being, and functions as the principle 
of life and the bearer of a human being’s destiny. Because it partakes of the 
nature of the Supreme Being, therefore it cannot have physical attributes. 
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xi  Another of the epitaphs assigned to God
xii  I am indebted to Professor Kofi Ackah for his criticisms during the 
presentation of this paper at a seminar in the Department of Philosophy 
and Classics, University of Ghana, which illuminated some of my 
misperceptions regarding this point and helped me to construct this 
argument in its present state. 
xiii The qualification ‘at large’ is meant to indicate that this is not the post-
enlightenment and scientific understanding of nature as the physical or 
material world.
xiv   This law states that an object is equal to itself: X = X. 
xv The principle that for any given P, either P is true, or its negation is true.
xvi   One such system is autoepistemic logic, which replaces the law of excluded 
middle with the concept of negation as failure which proposes a third 
possibility: the truth of a proposition is unknown. Other systems allow for 
the assertion of the law of the excluded middle as a true fact but not as an 
a priori condition for truth.
xvii  Conceived as a feature of the metaphysical notion of Mind or Spirit.
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